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L INTRODUCTION
This Note is an analysis of how federal courts have dealt with the
issue of whether arbitrators are empowered to award punitive damages.
The first section of the Note is a discussion of the Second Circuit case,
Fahnestock v. Waltman,1 which denied such power to arbitrators. The
second section notes the differences on this issue among the circuits. The
next two sections serve as background explanation of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) and arbitration of commercial and labor disputes.
The last section discusses the conflict between the Second Circuit and the
other federal circuits on this issue. I conclude that the Second Circuit's
reasoning in recent cases discloses an intent to deprive arbitrators of the
power to award punitive damages in derogation of Supreme Court
precedent to the contrary.
II. FAHNESTOCK V. WALTMAN
A. The Fahnestock Decision
Falmestock hired Waltman on March 16, 1982 as a "registered
representative to head Falanestock's Retirement Trust Division"2 and "to
manage and build Fahnestock's insurance products business." 3 Waltman
acted as an insurance sub-licensee to Falnestock. He also established a
general insurance agency in Pennsylvania to market insurance and annuity
products for Fahnestock. Waltman was fired by Fahnestock on December
12, 1988, when Fahnestock closed its Retirement Trust Division.4
Upon firing Waltman, Falmestock filed a Form U-5 termination
notice with the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) that
indicated that the discharge resulted from "business consolidation." s
Later, Fahnestock noticed that some files were missing and asked Waltman
to return them. Waltman refused because he thought that the files
1. Fahnestock & Co., Inc. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
380 (1991).
2. Id. at 514.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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belonged to the general insurance agency. Waltman said that he would
furnish Fahnestock with the files if Fabnestock obtained a release and
indemnification from each registered agent named in the files.6
Waltman's response led Fahnestock to do two things. Fabnestock
filed a request with the New York Stock Exchange to get the files from
Waltman and then filed an amended Form U-5. In the amended form,
Fahnestock changed an answer to one of the questions to indicate that
Waltman was under "internal review for fraud or wrongful taking of
property, or violating investment-related statutes, regulations, rules or
industry standards of conduct."7
An arbitration took place in which Waltman denied Fahnestock's
claim and counterclaimed that Fahnestock, and three company officers,
had defamed him by filing the amended Form U-5. After eight hearings,
which included testimony that Fahnestock had threatened Waltman in an
attempt to get the defamation action dropped, the arbitrators awarded
Waltman $56,000 in compensatory damages for wrongful discharge,
$14,700 in legal fees, $100,000 for defamation, and $100,000 in punitive
damages.' This award applied only to Fahnestock, as the actions against
the other corporate officers were dismissed.
Falmestock filed a petition to have the award vacated while
Waltman filed an action to confirm the award. Waltman's action was
stayed pending the outcome of the petition to vacate. The district court
vacated the arbitrator's award of damages.9
The central issue on appeal focused upon the lack of specified
remedies in the arbitration agreement. A majority of the Second Circuit
reasoned that since punitive damages were not specified, state law
governed the appropriate relief to be read into the agreement because the
jurisdictional basis of the federal court action was diversity of
citizenship.1" Judge Miner, writing for the majority, cited United States
Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that the propriety of punitive
damages is a matter of state law when the federal court's jurisdiction is
based upon diversity."
Having laid the theoretical basis for applying state law, the court
proceeded to examine the arbitration agreement itself. The most important
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 515.
10. Id. at 518.
11. Id. (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278
(1989)).
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fact concerning the arbitration agreement was the absence of an explicit
sanction of the punitive damages remedy. The court implied that such an
inclusion "may" have changed the outcome. The court scrutinized the
New York Stock Exchange's (N.Y.S.E.) constitution to discover if it dealt
with punitive damages. The court found no mention of such relief,
although the court did cite some board provisions of the constitution
regarding disposition of claims.'
The court pointed out that this case did not involve an arbitration
agreement that incorporated the rules of the American Arbitration
Association (AAA). The court found that fact significant because the
AAA has a broad clause that has been cited as authority for the power of
arbitrators to award punitive damages. The court stated, that if the
N.Y.S.E. had wanted to allow arbitrators to award punitive da'mages then
it should have made that clear, for such an allowance was well within its
power.'
Having found that the agreement did not provide for punitive
damages and the FAA does not preempt state law in this matter, the court
looked to state law to determine whether punitive damages were available.
Relying upon Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., the court in Fahnestock held
that punitive damages were not arbitrable.14 As a result, the court
affirmed the vacatur of the punitive damages award.
B. Mahoney in Dissent
Judge Mahoney dissented from the majority's affirmance of the
vacatur of the punitive damages award. Mahoney asserted that the
majority's reasoning had two faults. Mahoney criticized the majority for
misinterpreting the status to be accorded the FAA." Secondly, Mahoney
viewed the court's virtually exclusive focus on Garrity as skipping a step
in the proper analysis.16 The proper focus, in Mahoney's view, should
have been on the intent of the parties: was it their intent that punitive
12. Id. at 518-19.
13. Id. at 519.
14. Id. at 517. New York's Court of Appeals held that an arbitrator does not have the
power to award punitive damages even when the parties agree upon it. Garrity v. Lyle
Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 795 (N.Y. 1976). The court reasoned that "enforcement of an
[arbitrator's] award of punitive damages as a purely private remedy would violate strong
public policy." Id. In essence, Garrity held that the power to award punitive damages was
one reserved to the courts.
15. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 519 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 520.
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damages claims would be arbitrated?"
Mahoney's first argument was that the FAA is a unique
substantive law which curiously does not automatically accord independent
federal subject matter jurisdiction. There must be some other basis for
subject matter jurisdiction for the case to be heard in federal court.
However, Mahoney believed that the FAA was substantive law and was
applicable to the issue in this case:
The majority's approach effectively disregards the existence of
a "body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating
the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate," and imposes the
diversity regime of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). The Erie standard is intended, however, for "all
matters except those in which some federal law is controlling."
Id. at 72. It therefore seems to me clearly inappropriate to
apply Erie-generated rules to an area for which, the Supreme
Court has instructed, federal law supplies the rule of
decision.'"
Mahoney's second point, and perhaps the most important one in
his eyes, was that the agreement itself should have been examined.".
Mahoney was disconcerted that the majority gave short shrift to the fact
that the arbitrator award form used by the N.Y.S.E. makes an express
provision for the allowance of punitive damages." For Mahoney, this
treatment was representative of the blind adherence to Garrity in
derogation of all other issues.
At the very least, the United States Supreme Court precedent on
the construction of arbitration clauses, which sanctioned federal
arbitrators' use of punitive damages, and the existence of some evidence
that punitive damages were contemplated by the parties in the instant case,
should have led the court to examine the issue more closely. 1 At a
minimum, the court should have sent the case back to the district court for
an examination of the parties' contractual intent vis i vis resolution of
punitive damages claims. Mahoney did not conclude that the outcome of
such a remand would differ from the result reached by the majority, but
17. Id. at 521.
18. Id. at 520 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1982)).
19. Id. at 520 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 521.
21. Id.
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Mahoney did believe that the analysis should have been made.'
I. FEDERAL CIRCUrr COURTS
The Second Circuit alone has determined that state law concerning
an arbitrator's power to award punitive damages is controlling in the
absence of explicit contractual authorization. The other circuits that have
addressed this issue have invoked the broad policy concerns underpinning
the FAA in upholding arbitrators' awards of punitive damages. For the
other circuits, the FAA is controlling even when the parties have chosen to
be governed by the law of a state which does not allow arbitrators to
award punitive damages.
A. Ninth Circuit
The most recent circuit court to consider the issue of punitive
damages in the commercial arbitration context is the Ninth Circuit in Todd
Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd.' The Ninth Circuit was presented
with a commercial arbitration pursuant to a contractual clause between a
contractor, Todd Shipyards, an'd Cunard, the company which employed
Todd Shipyards to repair a ship. The dispute originated when Todd
Shipyards was unable to complete the contract for repair within the time
prescribed by the contract. Todd asserted, among other things, that
Cunard failed to provide the plans and specifications as provided in the
contract. This lack of performance by Cunard allegedly caused the delay
and caused Todd Shipyards to incur additional costs to repair the ship.'
The arbitration agreement included in the contract between the parties was
based on the American Arbitration Association rules. These rules and the
contract in question included a broad provision allowing the arbitrator to
award "any remedy or relief which is just and equitable and within the
terms of the agreements of the parties."'
In addition to this provision, the contract included a choice of law
provision designating New York law as applicable to the contract. Cunard
argued that under Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
22. Id. at 522.
23. 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991).
24. Id. at 1058-59.
25. Id. at 1062-63 (quoting Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association,
Rule 43 - Scope of the Award).
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Leland Stanford Junior University,' when a state choice of law provision
is included in a contract, state arbitration rules are to be followed. Thus,
since New York law prohibits arbitrators from awarding punitive damages
(Garrity), Todd could not recover them.' The court countered that
Cunard's argument misinterpreted Volt, and that Volt stood for the
proposition that federal courts will not disturb a state court's determination
that a choice of law provision indicates the parties meant for state
arbitration rules to apply.'
Having disposed of the choice of law problem, the court
summarily held that federal law was controlling in cases subject to the
FAA." At this point, the court analyzed the state of punitive damages
under federal law. The court dismissed the trend in labor arbitration cases
that have held that punitive damages are available only when the contract
expressly provides for them.3" Citing the First and Eleventh Circuits, as
well as various district courts, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the federal
policy in favor of broad arbitrability sustained the arbitrator's power to
award punitive damages.31
The Todd court noted the Fahnestock holding and distinguished it
from the other circuits that allowed arbitrators to award punitive
damages.3 2  The court found the inclusion of the AAA rules to be
dispositive on the issue of arbitrability of punitive damages because the
AAA had an expansive remedies clause. The Fahnestock agreement, on
the other hand, did not contain such a clause.
B. Eleventh Circuit
In 1988, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the arbitration of punitive
damages in Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.' There, the court
26. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
27. Todd Shipyards Corp., 943 F.2d at 1062.
28. Id.
29. Id. This case was subject to the FAA since the contract involved interstate
commerce.
30. See infra Section V for the difference between labor and commercial arbitration.
31. Todd Shipyards Corp., 943 F.2d at 1063. The court went on to judge the punitive
damages award under New York law in terms of its appropriateness under the facts - an
analysis which had nothing to do with Garrity.
32. Id. at 1063, n.6.
33. Id. at 1062.
34. 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1988).
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vacated a punitive damages award because it was procured through
fraud." However, the court did set out the applicable law on arbitration
of punitive damages to be applied on remand to a new arbitration panel.36
The facts in Bonar"7 are similar to those in Tod 3 in that the
agreement incorporated the rules of the AAA (through choice of forum
between N.Y.S.E. and AAA and others - the parties chose the AAA
forum). The agreement also expressly designated New York law in its
choice of law clause. The Eleventh Circuit invoked a prior decision in
holding that the choice of law provision, in this case New York (which
does not allow arbitrators to award punitives), does not vitiate the
arbitrator's power under the FAA to award punitive damages.39  The
court discussed the impact of Garrity on their analysis:
According to the Willoughby court, Garrity dealt only with the
powers of arbitrators under state law and state public policy,
and has no application in cases arising under the Arbitration
Act (citation omitted). Thus, a choice of law provision in a
contract governed by the Arbitration Act merely designates the
substantive law that the arbitrators must apply in determining
whether the conduct of the parties warrants an award of
punitive damages; it does not deprive the arbitrators of their
authority to award punitive damages.
According to the Bonar court, contracts that allow for punitive
damages, as evidenced here by inclusion of AAA rules, must take
precedence over choice of law provisions where the state law would
prohibit arbitrators from awarding the punitive damages. This conclusion
is bolstered by the fact that the Supreme Court has instructed that "any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
35. Id. at 1381. One of the witnesses for the plaintiff on the punitive damages issue
peijured himself.
36. Id. at 1386-87.
37. Id. at 1379-80.
38. Todd Shipyards Corp., 943 F.2d at 1058-59.
39. Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387 (discussing Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co., Inc. v.
Kajima International, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), affinned, 776 F.2d 269 (1lth
Cir. 1985)). The Bonar court understood Willoughby to stand as a "rule of construction for
contracts that, on the one hand, authorize punitive damages in arbitration, and, on the other
hand, call that authority into question with a choice of law provision. Willoughby tells us
that in light of the federal policy that 'any doubts concerning the scope of the arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,' we must give precedence to the contract
provisions allowing punitive damages." Id. (citations omitted).
40. Id. 835 F.2d at 1387.
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favor of arbitration.41
C. First Circuit
The other circuit to consider this issue is the First Circuit, which
held that arbitrators have the power to make punitive damages awards. In
Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Systems, Inc.42 the First Circuit was
presented with an arbitrator's award of punitive damages. The arbitration
agreement between the two parties (one a dealer of the other's
manufactured products) contained a clause which stated that "all disputes"
arising from the contract "shall be settled" through arbitration.' The
agreement also required that the arbitration be conducted pursuant to the
rules of the AAA, which contain a very broad grant of power to
arbitrators. There was no choice of law provision and, in fact, both
parties agreed that federal law controlled. The issue was framed as it was
in the previously mentioned cases: when the agreement has specified that
disputes shall be settled through arbitration, did the parties intend that
punitive damages be included?
The Raytheon court conducted a two-pronged analysis of the
issue.' First, the court discussed differences between labor arbitration
and commercial arbitration.' The court distinguished those cases on the
ground that a different policy was being served in the labor context."
Second, the court analyzed the approach of other courts. The
First Circuit discerned three approaches to this issue. The first approach,
the Garrity approach, posits that punitive damages are a sanction left only
to the courts. 47 The court also noted the criticism surrounding Garrity.
The second approach, adopted by an intermediate California court, allows
punitive damages only if the agreement provided for this remedy. 4
Ultimately, the court endorsed a third approach, exemplified by the Bonar
decision of the Eleventh Circuit. Since the court could find no other
federal circuits to the contrary, and because it found the Eleventh Circuit's
reasoning persuasive, the First Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit in
41. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
42. 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989).
43. Id. at 9.
44. Id. at 10-12.
45. Id. at 10.
46. See infra Section V for differences between labor and commercial arbitration.
47. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 11.
48. Id.
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sanctioning the award of punitive damages by arbitrators when the
arbitration is governed by the FAA.49
D. Second Circuit Reaffirmation - Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton
The Second Circuit has recently reaffirmed its anomalous position
on the issue of arbitral awards of punitive damages in Barbier v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton."0 The court decided the Barbier case upon narrower
grounds than Fahnestock, but the Barbier decision serves to demonstrate
the polarity of the Second Circuit's position. In Barbier, the plaintiffs
alleged that Shearson Lehman and Bendelac, one of its brokers, breached
their fiduciary duties, converted plaintiffs' money, and breached the
contract.'1 The dispute was arbitrated and the N.Y.S.E. panel found
grounds for an award of punitive damages.' A pertinent fact regarding
the agreement was the presence of a New York choice of law provision
(which is what really separates this case from Fahnestock).
While the district court upheld the award of punitive damages on
the ground that the parties intended to include such an award as part of
their agreement to arbitrate,m the court of appeals differed. The Second
Circuit found this case to be an easier one than Fahnestock because there
was an explicit choice of law provision. The district court termed Garrity
"arbitration law" and could not conclude whether the choice of law
provision meant to include arbitration law. The district court looked for
other extrinsic evidence of intent.' The circuit court, however, viewed
the choice of law provision as proof that the parties did not intend for
punitive damages to be available.' By choosing New York law, the
parties intended to be bound by Garrity. The court reiterated its
interpretation that the FAA is not in conflict with Garrity and went on to
say that this case was actually consistent with the spirit of the FAA. That
is, the court was more than willing to enforce the agreement to arbitrate,
but it would decide substantive questions of law, such as the availability of
punitive damages, according to Garrity.s6
49. Id. at 12.
50. 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991).
51. Id. at 119.
52. Id.
53. Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 752'F. Supp. 151, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
54. Id. at 156.
55. Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122.
56. Id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 8:2 1993]
IV. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (FAA) -
SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION
The FAA was designed to make parties comply with their
agreements to arbitrate. A steady trend of Supreme Court cases have
upheld and expanded this policy in order to encourage the arbitration of
disputes.
The first case which had an impact in this area was Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,' where the Supreme
Court held that a claim of fraud in inducement to contract was arbitrable
under the FAA. The thrust of this decision, as well as those that follow,
is that issues are arbitrable unless the parties expressly exclude them.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.58 represents the Supreme Court's understanding that Section 2 of
the FAA created a "body of federal substantive law of arbitrability,
applicable to any arbitration agreement" which it covers. 9 This decision
announced that the FAA preempted state substantive and procedural law to
the contrary.
In Southland Corp. v. Keating,'" the Supreme Court allowed the
arbitration of claims which arose from statutory law that indicated such
claims would be determined judicially. Shortly after this decision, the
Supreme Court extended Southland by requiring arbitration of state
securities claims that were pendent to non-arbitrable federal securities
claims in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd."'
The Court has consistently extolled the public policies behind the
FAA. The FAA requires federal as well as state courts to give a liberal
construction to agreements to arbitrate, and it also represents a
congressional intent to compel arbitration of issues arguably covered by
the agreement. The definite trend is toward expansion of the FAA's
coverage.
57. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
58. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
59. Id. at 24.
60. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
61. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
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V. THE LABOR CONTEXT V. THE COMMERCIAL CONTEXT -
DIFFERENCES
A. Labor Context
The trend in the arbitration of labor law cases has been to allow
arbitration of punitive damages issues only when the contract explicitly
authorizes such power. The rationale for the distinction between labor and
commercial arbitration lies in the nature of the process in which labor
arbitration arises. Since labor arbitration is only part of a larger collective
bargaining process in many cases, there is a distinct need to preserve a
relationship conducive to future amelioration of disputes between the
parties. Punitive damages in this context may undermine a good working
relationship that is necessary for parties to continue to resolve their dispute
privately.'
The fear is that arbitrations resulting in the award of punitive
damages will destroy the confidence that companies and the unions have in
the bargaining process. This destruction arises from the nature of punitive
damages as a severe reprimand denoting unconscionable conduct. The
cases which have disallowed the arbitration of punitive damages in the
labor context frequently invoke this rationale in support of their position.
B. Commercial Context
Arbitration conducted in the commercial setting differs from labor
arbitration primarily because it is a "one-shot deal." The fears attendant
to the award of punitive damages in the labor context do not exist in the
commercial context because the commercial parties have chosen this forum
as a "'simpl[e], informalol, and expeditio[us]' method of resolving a
particular dispute."' The arbitration is not part of a greater process of
ameliorative resolution with an intrinsic value of its own - commercial
arbitration is merely a quick, inexpensive resolution of one dispute.
62. See Raytheon v. Automated Business Systems, 882 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1989).
63. Id. at 11 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
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VI. DISCUSSION
A. Conflicting Circuits?
Is there a conflict between the Second Circuit and the other
federal circuits that have considered arbitral awards of punitive damages?
A close reading of Fahnestock4 and BarbierO discloses that the Second
Circuit does not think so. It believes that its decisions can be reconciled
with the other circuits on the facts. Fahnestock and Barbier involved
agreements that did not incorporate the rules of the AAA (which have
been construed to provide for the award of punitive damages). The other
circuits confronted only agreements that included AAA arbitrations, while
the Second Circuit has dealt mainly with N.Y.S.E. arbitrations for which
the agreements to arbitrate lack the expansive grant of powers to the
arbitrator which the AAA contains.
However, the underlying logic used by the Second Circuit to
justify the vacatur of punitive damages awards belies its confidence in not
being in conflict. Several notions that the Second Circuit used in the
course of the Fahnestock and Barbier opinions disclose that its conception
of how to evaluate the power of arbitrators is different from that of the
other circuits.
The first clue in discerning the Second Circuit's rationale is its
constant reference to diversity jurisdiction as the basis for hearing the
case.' The court claims that because it hears the case based solely on
diversity as subject matter jurisdiction, the FAA is not in conflict since it
represents substantive federal law only insofar as it regulates and enforces
agreements to arbitrate. The FAA's purpose is to bolster agreements to
arbitrate,67 but it does not represent independent federal question
jurisdiction. Thus, the court must look to state law for the resolution of
the substantive issue of punitive damages: "[I]n a diversity action, or in
any other lawsuit where state law provides the basis of decision, the
propriety of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in question...
[is a] question[] of state law."68
64. 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991).
65. 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991).
66. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518.
67. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1984).
68. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278 (1989)).
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B. Second Circuit Approach
The Second Circuit seems to view the FAA as substantive
preemptive law only when the issue is whether an agreement to arbitrate
will be enforced, but not preemptive on the issue of how the agreement is
to be construed. Its analysis appears to proceed in this fashion:
1. Does the agreement specify that punitive damages are
available? If yes, then possibly enforce it. If not, then
proceed to #2.
2. Is there federal substantive law on point? No, the FAA
is substantive only on issues regarding the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate.
3. Therefore, state law on punitive damages applies -
Garrity commands that arbitrators are powerless to award
punitive damages so the arbitrator has exceeded his/her
power.
The key to this analysis is the first step. If the court can construe
the agreement to be completely silent on the availability of punitive
damages, then it can proceed to Garrity. This is how the Fahnestock
opinion can be harmonized, on the surface, with decisions of the other
circuits; the other courts have not had to go past step one. In those cases,
the rules of the AAA were applicable, and thus the agreement itself
provided for the punitive damages. Furthermore, Supreme Court
precedent on the FAA enables courts to override state law on this because
the issue is one of enforceability of the agreement.
While the N.Y.S.E. rules of arbitration are admittedly less
expansive than those of the AAA in their grant of power to arbitrators, the
court should not have ended its analysis of whether punitive damages are
included in the agreement at this juncture. The court has overlooked the
abundant Supreme Court precedent which sets forth the rules of
construction when an agreement to arbitrate is evaluated: "[A]mbiguities
as to the scope of the. arbitration clause [are] resolved in favor of
arbitration. " 69 Also, "as with any other contract, the parties' intentions
control, but those intentions are generously construed as to
arbitrability. "7 One more caveat: "[A]ny doubts concerning the scope
69. Volt v. Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustess of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989).
70. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
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of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration."'
Mahoney, in his dissent in Fahnestock, picked up on this analysis.'
A second point on the court's "construction" is that in Fahnestock
the majority was unwilling to view the N.Y.S.E. form, which provided for
punitive damages, as probative on the issue of contractual intent, thus
evidencing the court's cursory search into whether the agreement
contemplated punitive damages awards. The court seemed to note the
difference between the AAA provisional grant of power and the
N.Y.S.E.'s relatively narrower endowment as dispositive on the issue.
Third, the court twice hinted that even if the agreements had
specifically provided for the award of punitive damages, the court was still
not certain that Garrity would be overruled: "We emphasize that an
agreement between the parties specifically to award punitive damages may
well have dictated a different outcome."7' This indicates that the court is
hesitant to agree that the FAA represents substantive law which would
apply to enforcement of the parties' private agreement to arbitrate punitive
damage claims.
The fourth point on the court's interpretation of the agreement
arises out of choice of law discussion. In Barbier, the court emphasized
the choice of law provision in the agreement to arbitrate, determined that
this precluded the Fahnestock drill, and ended the analysis at step one.
That is, the choice of law provision evidenced a clear intent by the parties
to exclude punitive damages claims from the scope of the arbitrator's
power. The Second Circuit in Barbier was willing to look beyond the
agreement to arbitrate, but in Fahnestock it was not. The difference is
that by looking beyond the agreement in Barbier, the court reached the
Garrity rule that it desired to employ.
In addition, the Second Circuit seems to hold the presumption that
punitive damages claims are deemed excluded unless otherwise provided
for: "Clearly, if the NYSE wanted to empower arbitrators to award
punitive damages, it could have done so." 74 The contrary is true in the
other circuits where the Supreme Court's recommendations on construing
agreements in favor of arbitrability are the assumed basis from which to
proceed.
71. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
72. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 521 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 518. At another point in the opinion, the court stated: "If the parties had
agreed to permit the arbitrators to make such an award, federal arbitration law might require
confirmation." Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 516.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's Fahnestock decision marks the advent of
confrontation with the FAA and Supreme Court precedent, as well as with
other federal courts. While Fahnestock can arguably be harmonized on its
face with current arbitration law, serious undertones of the court's decision
reveal a proclivity to apply New York's Garrity rule over federal law to
the contrary. The court's apprehension and hesitancy over the outcome
where parties expressly agree to arbitrate punitive damages evidences a
misunderstanding of the proper approach to the resolution of issues of
arbitrability of punitive damages.
Judge Mahoney, in dissent, correctly points out the faulty
reasoning employed by the majority in Fahnestock. The two major faults
revolve around construction of the agreements to arbitrate and the correct
status to be accorded to the FAA.
The proper procedure for a reviewing court in this situation is
first to examine the agreement to arbitrate. If there is an express
provision authorizing the award of punitive damages, then the analysis
stops, and the strong federal policy of enforcing parties' agreements to
arbitrate dictates that the award is within the arbitrator's power regardless
of state law. If the agreement explicitly rejects the grant of authority over
claims of punitive damages, then that agreement should be heeded. If the
agreement does not expressly contain such a provision, then the court must
make an inquiry into the intent of the parties: did they contemplate the
inclusion of punitive damages claims?
If the parties' intent cannot be determined, the court should
construe the agreement in favor of arbitrability according to the precedent
set forth by the Supreme Court. The federal policy which underlies the
FAA indicates a congressional intent to foster the private resolution of
disputes, and any ambiguities should be resolved in favor of such private
resolution.
Michael L. Collyer

